You are welcome to that opinion, take it up with your lawmakers, vote based on it, or run for office yourself to make it reality.
Just don't think you will make such proxies disappear with technical means -- in particular not where they are mandated by law.
I fully agree with you when we're talking about people trying to make money by modifying 3rd party traffic.
But I leave it to the relevant legislatures (and their electorates!) to decide with respect to libraries, schools, prisons, financial traders, spies, police offices and so on.
With respect to HTTP/2 there were two choices:
1) Try to use the protocol to force a particular political agenda through.
2) Make the protocol such that people behind manipulating proxies have notice that this is so, and leave the question of which proxies whould be there to the political systems.
Implementing policy with protocols or standardisation has never worked and it won't work this time either.
At the end of the day: IETF has no army, NSA is part of one.
Fair enough. My point, however, was that an always-encrypted internet protocol would not prevent the legitimate uses of these proxies - namely, the monitoring and blocking of attempts to access particular hosts on a network - from being possible; any competent network administrator could implement filters on particular network addresses and hostnames without needing to decrypt anything in the application and transport layers, since they're operating beneath those layers in the first place (perhaps from the router/firewall, even; I'm willing to bet that such monitoring/blocking would be relatively trivial to implement as a pf ruleset, using tables for blacklisted or whitelisted hosts) or are otherwise able to view information beyond what's encrypted (such as DNS lookups). That seems to be much easier and more surefire than trying to break into TLS sessions.
Just don't think you will make such proxies disappear with technical means -- in particular not where they are mandated by law.
I fully agree with you when we're talking about people trying to make money by modifying 3rd party traffic.
But I leave it to the relevant legislatures (and their electorates!) to decide with respect to libraries, schools, prisons, financial traders, spies, police offices and so on.
With respect to HTTP/2 there were two choices:
1) Try to use the protocol to force a particular political agenda through.
2) Make the protocol such that people behind manipulating proxies have notice that this is so, and leave the question of which proxies whould be there to the political systems.
Implementing policy with protocols or standardisation has never worked and it won't work this time either.
At the end of the day: IETF has no army, NSA is part of one.