This seems like an unsupported assertion. LLMs already exhibit good functional understanding of and ability in many domains, and so it's not at all clear that they require any more "awareness" (are you referring to consciousness?) than they already have.
> the spark of awareness required to be intelligent.
Again, this seems like an assumption - that there's some quality of awareness (again, consciousness?), that LLMs don't have, that they need in order to be "intelligent". But why do you believe that?
> We’ve all had sudden insights without deliberation or thought.
Highly doubtful. What you mean is, "without conscious thought". Your conscious awareness of your cognition is not the entirety of your cognition. It's worth reading a bit of Dennett's work about this - he's good at pointing out the biases we tend to have about these kinds of issues.
> We might very well be able to fake it to an extent that it fools us
This leads to claiming that there are unobservable, undetectable differences. Which there may be - we might succeed in building LLMs that meet whatever the prevailing arbitrary definition of intelligence is, but that don't possess consciousness. At that point, though, how meaningful is it to say they're not intelligent because they're not conscious? They would be functionally intelligent. Arguably, they already are, in many significant ways.
This seems like an unsupported assertion. LLMs already exhibit good functional understanding of and ability in many domains, and so it's not at all clear that they require any more "awareness" (are you referring to consciousness?) than they already have.
> the spark of awareness required to be intelligent.
Again, this seems like an assumption - that there's some quality of awareness (again, consciousness?), that LLMs don't have, that they need in order to be "intelligent". But why do you believe that?
> We’ve all had sudden insights without deliberation or thought.
Highly doubtful. What you mean is, "without conscious thought". Your conscious awareness of your cognition is not the entirety of your cognition. It's worth reading a bit of Dennett's work about this - he's good at pointing out the biases we tend to have about these kinds of issues.
> We might very well be able to fake it to an extent that it fools us
This leads to claiming that there are unobservable, undetectable differences. Which there may be - we might succeed in building LLMs that meet whatever the prevailing arbitrary definition of intelligence is, but that don't possess consciousness. At that point, though, how meaningful is it to say they're not intelligent because they're not conscious? They would be functionally intelligent. Arguably, they already are, in many significant ways.