As both a former army officer as well as someone who appreciates historical Chinese, it pains me to say that I found it underwhelming. I’m not saying that any one on here is like this, but in my experience it def attracts a certain type who, among other things, have a zero sum, “business is war” mindset that’s a tad creepy. Unlike everyone I know who has actually served .
Sun Tzu's work was aimed at nobled who had zero experience and knowledge in warfare; a lot of it is low-hanging fruit, but you have to build up the basis for these things like "make sure your soldiers have food" and "don't tell your opponent what you're up to" in these people.
It's why I don't understand why in the US, the president is also the top military commander. I'm sure they have good advisors and the good ones have done their homework, but it's not their profession in the end.
> It's why I don't understand why in the US, the president is also the top military commander.
Somebody has to be in charge of the military. If that person is just someone promoted from within, you're never more than one person's decision from a coup d'etat, "A republic, if you can keep it". So, an elected leader it is.
Of the three branches of the US government, only one is intended to provide an executive function, to decide, in an instant where necessary, without deliberation and compromise. The President. So that's the right person for the job of ultimate military commander, and it's one of the few things about that job which the voters seem to actually have some idea about.
Both the US and UK systems are under-staffed. The UK shares the job of executive leader and legislative leader (very different skill sets) under one role "Prime Minister" - while the US shares the job of executive leader and head of state (a figurehead) which also require totally different skill sets under the role of "President". This would make sense with a very small population, but it's crazy to imagine these huge countries couldn't find two people to do these very different jobs even a little better than one man (and in the US it has always been a man somehow) can do both.
According to the wiki, it's the chancellor in wartime (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundeswehr). Either way, it's a civilian position that's temporarily filled by the ruling government which was democratically elected.
What counts as "war" though? Technically every President since Roosevelt has used military force without a formal declaration of war by Congress. And modern Germany is not a military power projecting hegemon. I can't imagine a civilian defense minister (who in a coalition government maybe isn't even the party of the chancellor) is ordering politically important drone strikes like the US President. If Germany was in similar role the system would quickly evolve that the Chancellor would order the military.
It's traditionally the head of state, so King makes sense. In Bulgaria the president is mostly a figurehead with very limited power (basically easily repeatable veto, appoint ambassadors and temporary cabinets when there's no active government pending elections), but is still the commander in chief of the armed forces.
The UK - as usual - is a patchwork of conflicting traditions.
There is no Royal Army. But all members of the armed forces, police, and certain prominent political appointments, swear an Oath of Allegiance to the monarch.
Note this is not to the country. And certainly not to the people. Not even to the Crown, which is a kind of abstract superclass of British monarchs in general.
The Royal Navy does not have to swear this oath. It exists by direct Royal Prerogative which means it's assumed to be loyal, pretty much by definition.
Indeed, my understanding is that the British Army was created by and legally answerable to Parliament, unlike the other armed forces. As you mentioned, a remain of mistrust after the monarch was restored to the throne after the civil war (though the navy did remain under the monarch's control). Also, there are royal units within the Army, but the whole of the army is not regimented in this way.
> It's why I don't understand why in the US, the president is also the top military commander. I'm sure they have good advisors and the good ones have done their homework, but it's not their profession in the end.
War is ultimately a political endeavor; the goal of a war is to compel, by use of military force, some sort of political objective. It only makes sense then that the person in charge of directing when and where that military force is used is also the person who is empowered to carry out the political policy of the entire country.
For people who rise to the top of the military from within, every political problem becomes a nail in want of the military hammer for a solution, and thus the default answer to every crisis tends to become war. The Cuban Missile Crisis was defused without a war because both Kennedy and Khrushchev couldn't bring themselves to push the button marked nuclear war, while virtually the entire military establishment was convinced, and forcefully arguing, that the only way out of the situation was to be the first to push that button.
I’m not sure about the “military hammer for a solution”. At least not these days. Sure there are some- Wesley Clark’s push into Kosovo seemed suspect to me at the time. But there are many of the Colin Powell types who resist these unnecessary entanglements.
I wouldn’t be surprised if back in the Grenada/Panama era of the 80’s that there may have been many chomping at the bit. These days, I’m guessing not so much.
Not sure why you are using Colin Powell as an example. He’s one of the worst stooges, helping both covering up the My Lai massacre and presenting false evidence for the UN regarding the Iraqi WMDs.
I’ve never heard about Powell and My Lai. Feel free to point me in the right direction.
As to Iraq and WMDs, you could prob call him a “stooge” if you wanted to. But the little I know from a distance, that was something that racked his conscience for the rest of his life.
A relative told me in the 70's that I never had to worry about WW III until Yugoslavia disintegrates after Tito dies. He said all the realistic war plans revolved around that, which is why all the NATO cadres were all hysterical in the 90s.
Grenada, they never had time to think about it - it took three days for the most mighty military in the world to secure one of the tiniest nations in the world.
After 9/11, Rumsfeld asked the Army for their plans. They gave him a stack of plans on occupying Afghanistan and requirement for 600K troops (per doctrine) - they had no intention of volunteering. He was furious to be sidelined when the CIA guy convinced W it could all be done with small teams and airpower.
For Iraq, Rumsfeld agreed to all their plans and they saluted happily when he said to not make any occupation plans...
> the president is also the top military commander
It's also true in quite some other countries, and it is to ensure that the military remains subordinated to the civil government, after the many examples of military coups in History.
They can, but you have over a million members of the military who have all sworn an oath that they will "obey the orders of the President of the United States." If they had all sworn an oath that they will "obey the orders of General McEvilFace," it would be a lot easier to maneuver all your coup pawns into place even over the protestations of the president, even without those soldiers needing to fully realize that a coup was being set up.
Americans disagree about a lot, including how to interpret the Constitution and which parts of it are more or less important. But I would really hope that myself and any other random American can at least agree that our Constitution is the rule book that we must all live by and that it is ultimately what binds us as a nation.
It's interesting that this shared allegiance to the Constitution was still strained to the breaking point 160+ years ago. I wonder how U.S. military leaders must have felt when huge swaths of the military (and military leaders) decided that bond was no longer strong enough for them to maintain their loyalty to it.
I agree that's what Americans should agree on, but did you miss the part where certain very prominent Americans have been vocal about how inconvenient the Constitution is and that any provision of it which they disagree with should be 'terminated'? I'm afraid we're not all on the same page wrt the Constitution.
> did you miss the part where certain very prominent Americans have been vocal about how inconvenient the Constitution is and that any provision of it which they disagree with should be 'terminated'
Those prominent Americans include the original authors of said constitution: they always knew it would be a living document to be modified via amendments. Constitutional "originalists" who believe we should be totally beholden to a 240-year-old document with no changes are the ones who are not following either the spirit or the letter of the constitution.
I'm not talking about originalists, and I'm not talking about amending the Constitution through legitimate political process. I'm talking about people who feel that parts of the Constitution that they do not like they simply don't have to follow. That's about as unAmerican as it gets.
They can, of course, but it's harder for coup-ing superior officers to make dozen of thousands of 20y.o. Grunty McGruntFace follow them to overthrow the government when the very oath they swore was to that government, and that this oath explicitly states they don't have to follow General von Teufel orders in this case.
> It's why I don't understand why in the US, the president is also the top military commander.
Simple: the founders of the US thought it would protect our democracy to ensure that a elected civilian was in charge of the military. It's mostly worked.
Isn't there an even simpler answer? Back then most countries had their king ad their top military commander and the president of the US had a very similar role to a king.
Nope. There's a lot of writing about this issue from various founding fathers. There was great desire to avoid the President appearing to be a king or turning into one.
But it was still the model they were working from, the way of organizing state power that they understood and were familiar with. The three branches gov is in a lot of ways a secular and formalized form of the constraints religious and aristocratic political influence had on european monarchy in the era just preceding the revolution.
Plus what they say they wanted to achieve is not necessarily what they did achieve. That's not to say they failed and the president is a king, but the president is not entirely un-king-like either.
"Commander", yes, but they command very little. During World War II, President Roosevelt gave exactly two direct commands to the military - that they had to divert 50 long-range bombers to help protect Atlantic convoys, and that North Africa be invaded in 1942. In a four-year-long war, he gave two commands. Contrast that with Hitler, who micromanaged his military, and did them no good by doing so.
So, yes, he does have final command (subject to "legal orders" and similar restrictions). But he's not commanding in the normal sense of a military commander.
It's why I don't understand why in the US, the president is also the top military commander. I'm sure they have good advisors and the good ones have done their homework, but it's not their profession in the end.
Because technocracy is an awful form of government. In s democracy the buck has to stop with a politician, otherwise its tyranny.
They're not, really. The way that you advise the president on military issues is you give them prepackaged "decisions" that are limited variations on the same choice. The president's authority over the military is a legal fiction much like many other legal fictions that keep the system going.
> The president's authority over the military is a legal fiction
No, its not; and its kind of odd to say that during the era when not omly does the President fully exercise that power, they have for all practical purposes had it augmented by delegation (substantively on paper, and even more broadly in practice) of Congress’ power to declare war.
It’s true that most Presidents don’t micromanage the military, but they very much do command it, and a power generally used with some discretion and reserve is not the same as a legal fiction.
But the important thing about the President’s Commander-in-Chief role is not that it is a power (though it is), but that it is a constraint on the Congressional power to orgabize and set rules for the military.
I can guarantee you that there have been times where the top military brass walked into a meeting with the president with 3 options and left with an order to come up with something better. I have no insider knowledge but at the end of the day the president has the final say. Now I don't know how frequently the president overrides his military advisers but it must happen.
Not only that, but it's not like the head of state is alone with the military brass in such meetings. There will be people there both from the permanent civilian bureaucracy as well as advisors of some type from the party in power.
Ultimately, military grand strategy is a domain of politics as much as it is about how to wage war. The agendas and objectives are ultimately continuations of political goals of whoever is in power. During a war, the fighting must be coordinated with diplomacy, economy/trade/manufacturing and public relations/propaganda, all of which generals tend to know little about.
And even if the President is not the one making the micro decisions, he/she definitely is responsible for making sure the war is waged in a way that is aligned with the general objectives of the administration.
This means defining objectives, access to resources as well as defining the rules of engagement. And equally importantly, listen to the military and determine when the time is right to actually provide additional resources or permissions, despite political costs.
Perhaps. But it does prevent Latin America (and elsewhere) style military rule.
Instead we get military generals who act more like politicians the more senior they get (proven by study). And it seems that often politicians with little to lose and a lot to prove are often more hawkish than the military around them (Hilary Clinton, Wolfowitz, et al).
That's true in practice. So in theory, if the president wants things badly enough, he can keep push harder and also keep firing and hiring people until he gets what he wants.
Of course, that style is a lot harder, and thus consumes a lot more limited attention.
Most HNers, and sadly I include myself in this, couldn't fight their way out of a paper bag. We read Sun Tzu because it is recommended reading in the intelligentsia's mindset. It seems cool to learn battle technique from an ancient Chinese text. If I wanted to learn how to really fight a battle I'd go to Sandhurst or West Point.
Origins according to a many-times-over gilded comment on reddit (I forget which sub) went something like this -
subservient office culture in Japan where the big boss was reading it, so it spread to the entire organisation from where it spread to other organisations. It got to a point where no one knew why they were reading it, just that they had to. Around the same time it caught imagination of the Americans because of the Japanese (who were actually pretty efficient at their jobs).
Will look for the comment and post if it takes me less than 15 mins.
Edit: forgot how bad reddit search was. While I did not find what I was looking for, this [0] is one high quality answer you may be interested in. Only top comments are heavily moderated on that sub.
Modern militaries don't seem to enjoy the freedom to act and maneuver that a classic general enjoyed in the field (for good reasons). Modern requirements for transparency and democracy, and the interest of the military industrial complex don't help when you try to "appear weak when you are strong" or to "disguise a plan". For a mid-level army officer these things are probably even less applicable.
I still think there is huge potential for an overarching, creative strategy, and I wouldn't be surprised if the difficulties of Soviet/US forces in Afghanistan were not an accident, but sun-tzu'd in some way.
On the other hand, Russians employed „appear strong when you're weak“ very well leading up to Ukraine war. Everybody believed the myth of the 2nd army of the world. However, they ate their own propaganda...
> Modern militaries don't seem to enjoy the freedom to act and maneuver that a classic general enjoyed in the field (for good reasons). Modern requirements for transparency and democracy
I think modern democracies do a much better job of separating military and civilian leadership than dictatorships do. Putin seems to be too personally involved in micromanaging his war, insisting on conquests that are simply not possible (like Bakhmut and some other places). Hitler similarly interfered with his generals and hampered his war effort that way.
Zelensky is of course involved with the war, but he listens to his generals.
> "appear weak when you are strong"
That only seems useful if you want to lure the enemy into an attack in order to ambush him, but with our modern day sensibilities about the value of life, we prefer to have no attack at all. More applicable to us is "appear strong when you are weak", although such secrets never last long, so we prefer to appear strong when strong, in order to discourage any attack.
Also, Russia appeared strong while weak, and that didn't exactly work out well when Putin called his own bluff. Turns out he incorrectly believed the strong appearance of his own army. And he believed the West to be weak (or at least divided and disorganised), so he attacked.
It's not that these concerns are irrelevant, but they're a lot more complex than Sun Tzu makes them out to be, and it's possible to fall for your own disguise. Or maybe the civilian leadership can fall for the military's disguise.
That only seems useful if you want to lure the enemy into an attack in order to ambush him"
No, it is also good (necessary) for preparing a good offensive. If the enemy thinks you are weak in some area, he does not expect a push from that direction.
Ukraine did just that last fall very succesfull. Show off force and big noisy preparation of a offensive south and starting it loud. And then push hard, fast and unexpected in the north, after the enemy already moved more troops further south.
And then confusion and panic among the enemy, so a relativly small force could conquer vast lands.
> And he believed the West to be weak (or at least divided and disorganised), so he attacked.
That makes it sound as if Putin attacked because an opportunity presented itself.
I don't think that's why he attacked. I think he attacked because he felt he had no choice. Not because NATO was crowding into his borderlands, which is Putin's story; but because following the collapse of Soviet communism and the USSR, the rump Russia was clearly a state dependent mainly on resource-extraction, which desn't promise a great independent future. Especially with Europe's increasing development of non-fossil energy, earnings from fossil fuel exports could be expected to diminish rapidly.
But why Ukraine? Well, setting aside his deranged opinions about the historic unity of Ukraine and Russia, and the historic destiny of the "Rus", Ukraine was rapidly becoming closer to Europe, and Ukrainians were clearly happy with that prospect. Having a successful, happy fragment of the USSR on his border threatened his control over his own population.
> Turns out he incorrectly believed the strong appearance of his own army.
Agreed! In fact everyone overestimated the strength of his army.
> Not because NATO was crowding into his borderlands, which is Putin's story; but because following the collapse of Soviet communism and the USSR, the rump Russia was clearly a state dependent mainly on resource-extraction, which desn't promise a great independent future. Especially with Europe's increasing development of non-fossil energy, earnings from fossil fuel exports could be expected to diminish rapidly.
"Rapidly" but still on a decades scale, which Putin is unlikely to live to. Meanwhile he has forced Europe to look elsewhere for energy and drastically accelerated their plans.
> But why Ukraine? Well, setting aside his deranged opinions about the historic unity of Ukraine and Russia, and the historic destiny of the "Rus", Ukraine was rapidly becoming closer to Europe, and Ukrainians were clearly happy with that prospect. Having a successful, happy fragment of the USSR on his border threatened his control over his own population.
Poland and the Baltics are already on his border, and most of the former Warsaw Pact is already in the EU and happily progressing, with quality of life drastically better than in Russia. I really don't think this excuse works.
I guess you're right, it doesn't. I don't know what I'm talking about; I'm just someone who enjoys strategy games.
I'm also extremely interested in trying to figure out what Putin was thinking when he attacked, and why he didn't just pull back when his initial blitzkrieg failed.
I happen to think his own utterances and writings are a largely-accurate presentation of what he really believes about geo-politics; but they don't answer the "Why now?" question. I think you can understand his thinking by listening to what he says. I think he really believes "there's no such thing as Ukraine".
And regarding the Baltic states: they weren't in NATO, and individually they have short borders with Russia. Ukraine has a very long border with Russia.
> And regarding the Baltic states: they weren't in NATO
They have been in NATO since 2004. Narva in Estonia is <3 hours drive from St Petersburg, the second largest city in Russia. Poland also has a large border with Belarus which is for most intents and purposes a Russian client state. And the border with NATO argument falls even further apart when you consider that Russia occupying Ukraine will gain them hundreds of km of borders with NATO member states Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania.
> I'm also extremely interested in trying to figure out what Putin was thinking when he attacked, and why he didn't just pull back when his initial blitzkrieg failed.
> I think you can understand his thinking by listening to what he says. I think he really believes "there's no such thing as Ukraine".
I guess we'll never really know about his actual reasons, but as to why he didn't pull back - he's a strongman dictator, his whole persona is a tough guy. If he gets his nose bloodied and loses massive amounts of troops, that will be a huge blow to his reputation in Russia, which he can't really afford, lest someone near him things they can do a better job.
It appears he's psychologically unable to back down. He must double down on every stupid idea, a problem more strongman dictators seem to have. Maybe he believes he cannot lose and will ultimately win if he perseveres. Or maybe he thinks he can't afford to lose because it would ruin his image and lose his power.
My mistake, you're right. But not Finland. And I wasn't counting Poland, which was a former European imperial power; I don't think of Poland and Sweden as being Baltic states, even though their coastlines are Baltic coastlines. In the same way (roughly), I don't think of Greece as a Balkan state.
> I think he attacked because he felt he had no choice.
The feeling of having no choice tends to be influenced by incentives, though. Had NATO mobilized 5 million soldiers in eastern Poland in late 2021, with the clear message that they would send those forces into Ukraine if Putin attacked, he would probably feel differently.
Personally, I think he may have felt "it's now or never". It appears he started preparing directly after the 2020 election, and he may have misjudged Biden, thinking him too weak to respond.
> That makes it sound as if Putin attacked because an opportunity presented itself.
The west still appeared to be disrupted by COVID. The US and allies sent mixed signals on Ukraine which were interpreted as the US and West will let nature take it's course. The opportunity was there for Putin, and he took it. Putin wasn't wrong. Evidence: Biden tried to evacuate Zelenskyy leading to the famous quote, "I don't need a ride, I need ammo." The surprise to everyone was Ukraine fighting back ferociously. Now, Putin needs to realize the window has closed, and it is time to stop the madness.
Of course he has a choice. "Not having a choice" is just his own excuse for the choice he made. He could have continued trading with the EU while investing in the development of Russia, but that takes actual work and isn't glamorous. (Not to mention that much of that investment would probably be eaten by corruption.)
I think he saw a rapidly closing window of opportunity. A successful Ukraine would be a threat to his own rule over Russia, because there are a lot of ties between Russians and Ukrainians, and Russians would notice if a more EU-aligned Ukraine is more prosperous than Putin-ruled Russia, and that would undermine Putin's story of saving Russia's economy (which he did, between 2000 and 2008).
With increasingly closer ties between Ukraine and NATO, and Ukraine possibly even joining at some point, he has to take advantage of the fact that Ukraine wasn't in NATO yet. And NATO didn't respond to him taking land from Georgia in 2008, and the Crimea in 2014, so he figured they wouldn't do anything this time either. Besides, he'd invested a lot of effort into dividing the EU and NATO: funding extreme-right-wing parties all over Europe, supporting Trump, supporting Brexit, all things that seemed to make the EU and NATO weaker. But he vastly overestimated our weakness and his own strength.
That wasn't possible, and as far as I'm aware it remains impossible for now. I believe it is a prerequisite for joining NATO, that you should be in control of your internationally-recognized borders. Otherwise, at the moment of joining, the whole of NATO would instantly be at war with Russia, because NATO's supposedly a mutual defence treaty organisation.
Same goes for Georgia, as far as I can see; Georgia's internationally-recognized borders place South Ossettia inside Georgia. But South Ossettia remains occupied by Russia.
[Edit] FWIW, I don't think NATO is in shape to go to war in Eastern Europe. Western countries took advantage of the end of the Cold War and the "peace dividend" to hollow-out their armed forces and ammunition reserves. As a Brit, I'm particularly ashamed of Britain's conduct, which has involved committing huge amounts of money to two spiffy aircraft carriers, which still don't carry a full complement of F35s, and which can't operate without a fleet of destroyers and frigates, not to mention supply ships. And a new generation of strategic nuclear missile submarines. Having a stockpile of 122mm artillery shells would be massively cheaper, and a better use of money.
> I believe it is a prerequisite for joining NATO, that you should be in control of your internationally-recognized borders.
It’s not a formal prerequisite, but its probably a practical one.
> Otherwise, at the moment of joining, the whole of NATO would instantly be at war with Russia
There’s no theoretical reason the Accession Protocol for Ukraine couldn’t specify particular territories as excluded from the coverage of Article 6 until some specified future determination.
It is, and that's at least part of the reason why when Ukraine asked to join NATO, they were rejected. But NATO won't rule it out entirely, and Putin took that as a reason (a necessity, he claims) to invade Ukraine.
> Western countries took advantage of the end of the Cold War and the "peace dividend" to hollow-out their armed forces and ammunition reserves.
Even with those cuts, though, NATO has a far, far larger army than Russia. And far better. Though ammo shortages are definitely a big problem.
While you are correct that these sort of books can be taken too far (i.e. they are not an answer to everything) there is much value in studying these sorts of books (Chinese/Japanese/Indian etc.) since they are a repository of various stratagems/techniques/aphorisms/quotes which can be adapted to context (not necessarily explicit Warfare) to derive value. Human Nature has not changed much over the years though its external manifestations have. I also do not believe that you have to have served in the defense forces (which mainly focus on the mechanisms of Warfare) to understand them since they deal with general ideas/concepts/stratagems which are independent of a specific domain.
As an example, the quote Cast a Brick to Attract Jade from The 36 stratagems of War (https://changingminds.org/disciplines/warfare/36_strategems/...) is eminently usable in design/development/product plan meetings i.e. you present a simple and concrete idea as a starting point and then leave it to the attendees to build/modify/change it and come up with a best and final solution.
My interest in ancient cultures is how those people coped with life. Gilgamesh, torah, Aesop's fables, 1001 Arabian nights are interesting to me for how each culture dealt with and documented the human condition and social interactions.
To me Sun Tzu writings and all the ancient writings are about preparing one's "mind" for an attitude that can be used to cope. The commonality of story to a culture strengthens the social structure. The commonality is used to apply old wisdom to seemingly new and complex events. These writings become the common thread.
>the ancient writings are about preparing one's "mind" for an attitude that can be used to cope [with whatever Life may throw at you]
This is exactly it!
One of my interests is the study of "Worldly Wisdom"(have a bunch of books from different cultures in my collection) categorized into;
1) "Idealistic"(Ethical/Moral) - Lots of Philosophies/Holy Books/etc. deal with this.
2) "Realistic/Pragmatic"(the World as it is and not how you would like it to be) - These are the common books of Wisdom/Aphorisms/Quotes/etc. from Culture/Daily Life.
3) "Crooked/Cynical"(how to further self-interest/getting-back on wrongs) - These are books on Strategy/Kingship/etc.
I find it quite transformational studying this subject since it teaches one all aspects of dealing with/making sense of Life. With the ascendancy of Scientific thought and decline of traditional Religions it has become even more necessary for each of us to chart our own ways with whatever advice (adapted to Modern Science/Times) we can glean from these ancient texts.
I have a good collection of books on the topic of "Worldly Wisdom". Most books will span the categories and you have to tease their teachings into the above three buckets. When reading these books always remember that they were written in a specific Context/Time and hence would need reinterpretation in your specific context before application. Also as much as possible go to the original sources/authoritative translations instead of "popular" accounts of the same which are almost always dumbed down and virtually useless. The essence is in understanding the nuances and not the obvious "sound bite".
Here is a partial list in no specific order (lookup their reviews on Amazon/elsewhere on the web for details);
1) The Pocket Oracle and Art of Prudence by Baltasar Gracian translated by Jeremy Robbins. This book is also available as "The Art of Worldly Wisdom" translated by many others. Of these the one by Christopher Maurer is noteworthy.
2) A Pocket Mirror for Heroes by Baltasar Gracian translated by Christopher Maurer.
3) The Prince by Niccolo Machiavelli. Of the many translations, the one by Peter Bondanella in Oxford World's Classics is noteworthy.
4) Maxims and Reflections (Ricordi) by Francesco Guicciardini translated by Mario Domandi.
5) The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and His Arthashastra by Roger Boesche - A very nice summary of the magnum opus "Arthashastra" from Ancient India.
6) King, Governance, and Law in Ancient India: Kautilya's Arthasastra translated and annotated by Patrick Olivelle - A very good and modern translation of a large text.
7) The Essence of Politics (Sanskrit: Nitisara) by Kamandaki translated by Jesse Ross Knutson - A shorter Ancient Indian text in the vein of Arthashastra.
8) The Pancatantra: The Book of India's Folk Wisdom translated by Patrick Olivelle.
9) Tirukkuṟaḷ by Tiruvalluvar (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kural for details) - For a good English translation see the one translated by P.S.Sundaram and published in Penguin Classics.
10) The Art of War by Sun Tzu translated by Ralph D. Sawyer.
11) The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China translated by Ralph D. Sawyer.
12) [The Complete] Book of Five Rings by Miyamoto Musashi translated by Kenji Tokitsu.
I have left out the obvious works by Epictetus/Seneca/Cicero/Marcus Aurelius/etc. since they are all well known.
The above is a good representative of the three categories drawn from different cultures and should get you started.
> but in my experience it def attracts a certain type who, among other things, have a zero sum, “business is war” mindset that’s a tad creepy
Now, I haven't come across people quoting Sun Tzu in my career, but I know the type of person you're talking about.
They are the type to either stick around short-term as execs, just a couple years, or to escape with a golden parachute when things start to turn. Un-surprisingly, their accomplishments are often enough detrimental to the customers, the business or both. They are aggressive, but don't really have much skin in the game.
I feel like this is the Seinfeld is Unfunny effect, where something that's been woven into the very fabric of a certain field is then found to be underwhelming or cliche, because it's been copied and iterated upon so many times. But 3000 years ago The Art of War was absolutely groundbreaking.
Furthermore, as someone who like you has served in the armed forces, I agree amongst those who serve we do not think of "war is business", those in charge do absolutely think of "war as business".
I have no military background, but I like Sun Tzu's Art of War for some ideas about one's stance when engaging in "battle": I know it is more of a poetic liking than actual military advice.
