> you can reinitialize your Nano S as a new U2F device
According to the yubico explanation linked from article, U2F includes cloning protection (an authentication counter, which the site should check has increased vs. its last known value), so that might not actually work if the site you are authenticating against is well-implemented (Unless the Nano S also lets you back up the counter value).
> ... so that might not actually work if the site you are authenticating against is well-implemented
I'm using it on several sites and already did swap / reinitialize my U2F devices... It works, including on GMail. As I understand it the most recent Webauthn is going to be supported by Ledger soon.
I don't think they're non-compliant or badly implemented websites: although I'm not sure what the specs say.
I do personally love that I can back up my "seed" and know that by going to pick my safe at the bank I'll always be able to reinitialize an U2F device and I'll also really love that it displays "Google" on the Ledger Nano S's tiny screen.
Pricey little thing to use as "only" an U2F device: about 60 USD but I like it a lot.
> (Unless the Nano S also lets you back up the counter value)
Late reply but... As I understand it as long as the counter is monotonic it'll always work. What Ledger does (and apparently the Trezor too from reading this thread, another device with an HSM) is, upon initializing the U2F app the first time on your hardware device, is to set the counter to the current timestamp.
So basically: once you use another device to log in, then you cannot use the old one, unless you reinitialize it (and then it's the other you cannot use, unless you reinitialize it etc.). These devices do not have a clock, which is why it works that way (in the case of the Ledger Nano S / Ledger Nano X at least).
Cloned (i.e. initially set up with identical seeds) yubikeys definitely work without any communication about a counter value between them; my personal setup involves two keys so that I wouldn't lose access if I lose a key. There are some obvious drawbacks of that, of course, but it is an option that works, so either that description does not apply to such devices or it is misunderstood.
According to the yubico explanation linked from article, U2F includes cloning protection (an authentication counter, which the site should check has increased vs. its last known value), so that might not actually work if the site you are authenticating against is well-implemented (Unless the Nano S also lets you back up the counter value).