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The aspect of GEB that has not withstood the test of time is the Gödel part.

[Gödel 1931] seemed to have settled the issue of inferential undecidablity{∃[Ψ:Proposition](⊬Ψ)∧(⊬¬Ψ)} in the positive using the proposition I'mUnprovable, such that I’mUnprovable⇔⊬I’mUnprovable.

However, existence of I’mUnprovable would enable the following cyberattack [cf. Wittgenstein 1937]:

     Proof of a contradiction in foundations: First prove
     I’mUnprovable using proof by contradictions as follows:  
          In order to obtain a contradiction, hypothesize
          ¬I’mUnprovable. Therefore ⊢I’mUnprovable 
          (using I’mUnprovable⇔⊬I’mUnprovable).  
          Consequently, ⊢⊢I’mUnprovable using 
          ByProvabilityOfProofs {⊢∀[Ψ:Proposition<i>](⊢Ψ)⇒⊢⊢Ψ}. 
          However, ⊢¬I’mUnprovable (using 
          I’mUnprovable⇔⊬I’mUnprovable), which is the 
          desired contradiction.
     Using proof by contradiction, ⊢I’mUnprovable meaning 
     ⊢⊢I’mUnprovable using ByProvabilityOfProofs.  However, 
     ⊢¬I’mUnprovable (using I’mUnprovable⇔⊬I’mUnprovable), 
     which is a contradiction in foundations.
Strong types prevent construction of I’mUnprovable using the following recursive definition: I’mUnprovable:Proposition<i>≡⊬I’mUnprovable. Note that (⊬I’mUnprovable):Proposition<i+1> because I’mUnprovable is a propositional variable in the right hand side of the definition of I’mUnprovable:Proposition<i>. Consequently, I’mUnprovable:Proposition<i>⇒I’mUnprovable:Proposition<i+1>, which is a contradiction.

The crucial issue with the proofs in [Gödel 1931] is that the Gödel number of a proposition does not capture its order. Because of orders of propositions, the Diagonal Lemma [Gödel 1931] fails to construct the proposition I’mUnprovable.

See the following for more explanation: "Epistemology Cyberattacks" https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3603021



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