Secondly how many of these were remotely exploitable? Yes OpenBSD is limited in it's exposure with the "base system", but it seems like few of these pose as "holes" for the system? Arguably pledge(2) could factor into this, maybe? I'll let someone better qualified comment.
Again glad to see these fixed. But is the baseline free user access to the whole system for NetSec/ OpSec these days? I don't know maybe it is.
I'm just reluctant to have to read through the HN, "OMG OpenBSD had CVEs" and "C is insecure". Arguably the later has some merit but C isn't going away anytime soon, for better or for worse.
> Secondly how many of these were remotely exploitable?
I don't think this is a valid question. The vulnerabilities are in syscalls. Unless some application exposes them in a very unexpected way, they're local-only by design.
Secondly how many of these were remotely exploitable? Yes OpenBSD is limited in it's exposure with the "base system", but it seems like few of these pose as "holes" for the system? Arguably pledge(2) could factor into this, maybe? I'll let someone better qualified comment.
Again glad to see these fixed. But is the baseline free user access to the whole system for NetSec/ OpSec these days? I don't know maybe it is.
I'm just reluctant to have to read through the HN, "OMG OpenBSD had CVEs" and "C is insecure". Arguably the later has some merit but C isn't going away anytime soon, for better or for worse.